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Abstract
In our paper, individual programmers participate in OS programming to
signal their programming skills to commercial software companies and companies use OS projects as a screening device for hiring new workers. The
key feature of the model is that the signaling activity itself creates a market
externality a¤ecting the commercial software companies’pro…ts as the signaling activity creates a program that will be freely available to consumers.
We show that in the least cost separating equilibrium, the programming
credential in the case of a free substitute (complement) OS software is lower
(higher) than in the case of independent programs. We also show that for
the software companies’ management, OS projects may function as clever
screening mechanisms for new workers without committing to hire anyone
before they have actually shown their capability as a programmer. Finally,
there is a con‡ict of interest between the private and social incentives over
the choice of an OS project when the size of the market for consumer software is small; the society would prefer a substitute OS project rather than
complement.
JEL Classi…cation: D23, D82
Keywords: signalling, screening, professional labor market, programming, open source software, OSS
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1

Introduction

This paper is inspired by two observations from the open source software
environment and software industry in general. It is widely documented that
individual programmers develop software in open source environments that
provide no immediate direct (monetary) payo¤s for their programming effort4 . Why do they get involved in such ventures? Equally well, commercial
software companies do support and subsidize such open source communities in various ways.5 What is the motivation behind …rms’behavior given
that these communities may potentially be even harmful by providing free
open source programs that compete with their own commercial (copyright)
programs?
We show within the formal yet simple model that indeed such behavior is fully rational. On one hand it can be explained by the incentives of
independent programmers to participate in open source projects in order
to signal their innate programming ability to commercial software companies. On the other hand, from the software companies’management point of
view, the open source projects function as screening mechanisms for hiring
new competent and highly talented workers. The …nancial support for OS
projects can thus been seen as a clever managerial practice of motivating
potential employees to demonstrate their programming capability without
committing to hire anyone at that stage. It is only after someone has shown
his talent in OS programming by getting a high status ("programming credential") within the OS project that the software company is willing to hire
and pay a high salary to a top performer.
We base our analysis on a skill signaling approach in OS environments
(c.f. for instance Lerner and Tirole 2002) and extend the signaling model
…rst presented by Spence (1973, 1974, 2002) into a case where the signalling
activity in the programmers’professional labour market creates an external4

For descriptions of open source, see for instance Raymond 1998, Browne 1999, GNU
2000a, 2000b, Kogut and Metiu 2001 and Lerner and Tirole 2002.
5

See for instance IBM News 2001, Collab.net 2001, Hann et al. 2002, Mustonen 2004.
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ity a¤ecting the software companies’pro…ts.6 We assume that the signaling
activity itself creates as a by-product a program that will be freely available to consumers, and the externality e¤ect arises via the interaction of
the freely available OS program and commercial software. Our modelling
choices allow us to cover both positive and negative market externalities.
That is, we consider both complementary and substitute OS programs. The
motivating examples from software market that we have in our minds are
for instance Openo¢ ce that is likely to be a complement to commercial
operating systems like Windows, whereas Linux is a substitute for them.
Interestingly, in our case the signalling activity as such is not social waste
since it will eventually realize in a free software that consumers value, and
clearly this is valuable for the society as well.
Our model has three types of players; programmers, software companies
and consumers, who will interact in two types of markets: the professional
labor market and the software market. We start by examining programmers’
(who di¤er in their innate ability) incentives in participating in OS projects
and software companies’ hiring and derive a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE) of the signaling game. In particular, we show that the programming
credential that the high productivity programmer needs to attain in order to
separate from the low productivity programmer in the case of free substitute
OS software is lower than in the case of independent programs. This is due
to the fact that in the case of substitutes, the software company’s pro…ts are
reduced due to a negative market externality ("intensi…ed competition"),
which will also reduce wages, and thus in the equilibrium the least cost
separating programming credential is reduced as well. This implies that in
terms of "quality" (as lines of code transforming into the functionality of a
program), the substitute open source program has lower quality than the
independent program.
Similarly, we show that in the case of a complementary program due to a
6

In our companion paper Leppämäki and Mustonen (2004) we consider the signaling
with positive and negative externalities in more general framework and provide a complete
characterization of the equilibria with respect to the magnitude of externalities and market
size.
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positive market externality ("increased willingness to pay for the commercial
software") the pro…ts of the software company are now higher, which will
be re‡ected in higher wages, and therefore the programming credential in
the least cost equilibrium will be higher than in the case of independent
programs. Thus the resulting free complementary open source programs
will have higher "quality".
We also examine the role of an open source project as a possible screening
device from the software companies’point of view. We assume there exists a
high enough outside option (wage) that implies that the commercial software
companies cannot even exist without screening of workers. We show that
commercial software companies may indeed be willing to subsidize open
source projects in order to be able to screen workers to enjoy non-negative
pro…ts.
Finally, we analyze private and social incentives concerning the choice of
an OS project. Our main analysis reveals that an individual programmer has
an incentive to devote his attention towards OS projects where the outcome
of the signalling activity has some complementaries with the commercially
produced software. However, this need not always be in the interests of
society, and thus we derive the exact conditions under which the society as
such would prefer OS projects that will materialize in free substitute programs rather than complementary ones. This will depend most importantly
on the size of the consumer market. When the size of the market is small,
the society would prefer OS projects that will materialize in substitute programs. And when the consumer market for software is large, then both
the individual programmers and society would prefer complementary OS
projects.
It is also interesting and useful to contrast our theoretical model and
results with the practices of the software industry. There is rather strong
empirical evidence that software companies do hire new workers among the
top performers in various OS projects. In reality, open source software
projects often have home pages on internet where they post merit-based
ranking lists of the most important contributors (Hann et al. 2002, LinuxPAM 2003). They could even be called as ”hall of fames”. The fact that a

5
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programmer is at the top of the list implies that he/she has contributed to
the project in a major way by providing important or even crucial pieces of
code. We interpret this as being a programming credential (in our theoretical
model) that signals the programmers’innate abilities. That is, for a more
able programmer it is easier to get the top position at the merit based list.
In their recent paper Hann, Roberts and Slaughter (2002) provide …rst
empirical evidence of economic incentives of individual programmers within
the Apache web-server open source project.7 Their empirical results con…rm
the existence of economic returns; participation per se as measured by the
numbers of contributions made does not lead to wage increases, but a higher
status in a merit-based ranking does lead to signi…cantly higher wages. A
higher status in a merit-based ranking list is a credible signal of the productive capacity of a programmer. Thus their work gives support for the
delayed returns argument - motivation for participation is skill signalling8 .
Commercial software companies are willing to pay for high wages for the
top performers i.e. they interpret a high position at the merit-based ranking list being a credible signal of high innate productivity. One could even
interpret this type of hiring practices within OS communities as outsourcing
of personnel management and recruiting activities of commercial software
companies. In the recent empirical paper by Fershtman and Gandal (2004)
the authors found that skill signaling is the main motive for programming
e¤ort in OS projects that employ a restrictive (eg. GPL) license.
Equally well, it is public information that commercial software companies
do support OS projects in various of ways. It is important to notice that the
support need not be in the form of direct funding. In fact, the support can
take any form that simply helps the formation of OS projects. For instance,
over 100.000 independent OS programmers have registered to IBM’s services
to o¤er their programs just to Linux open source projects related to IBM.
In the relationship, the programmers and IBM exchange information. (IBM
2004)
7

Apache is used in 63% of the world’s over 100 million web servers (Netcraft 2001).
For discussions on delayed returns, we refer to Dasgupta and David (1987,1994),
Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) and Stern (1999).
8
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In the relatively new open source economics literature one can distinguish two lines of research; the incentive based approach (e.g. Bessen 2001,
Johnson 2002 and Bitzer and Schröder 2002) and consumer market analysis
(see Lerner and Tirole 2002, Mustonen 2003, 2004)9 In this paper we combine the two lines of research and propose a single model that incorporates
the idea of signalling in professional labor market that creates an externality e¤ect in software market due to appearance of free open source software,
and where the externality e¤ect may either be harmful or bene…cial to the
receiver of signal. The novelty of this paper is that it introduces a new way
for the signalling to work and it also provides a new motivation for …rms to
participate in and subsidize open source projects.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In next section we
present the model and the main analysis is carried out in section 3. In
section 4 we show that commercial software companies do have incentives
to support open source projects in order to screen their work force. Section
5 focuses on the individual programmers’ and society’s incentives over the
choice of an OS projects while section 6 concludes.

2

The Model

In this section we set up the model with three players who will interact in two
markets. We consider programmers who develop computer software either
within the OS projects or within commercial software companies. There are
also consumers who value available computer software. The two markets we
consider are professional labour markets where computer programmers and
software companies interact and computer software market where consumers
decide whether they buy a commercially produced software or acquire an
open source software for free.
9

See also Schi¤ (2002) who provides a survey of the early literature of OSS.
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2.1

Professional Labour Market for Programmers

We assume that there exists two types of programmers, who di¤er only
in their innate non-veri…able programming ability. It is assumed that the
high productivity programmers, so called ”good” type have a productivity
of = 2 and the low productivity programmers, so called ”bad” type have
a productivity of = 1, and that the share of ”good” types is equal to q.
In order to separate from the low productivity programmer, the high
productivity programmer may engage himself in an open source (OS) programming project. If an individual programmer’s contribution to the OS
programming project is large enough, his name will appear in the project’s
’top contributors’ or ’hall of fame’ list, which is public information.10 We
call this a programming credential and label it by y, 0 y y max . Notice
that y bears a similarity to Spence’s term ’education level’in the sense that
a given credential is more easily attainable for a high productivity programmer. Interestingly, within the context of OS programming, the programming
credential may have an externality e¤ect. The programmer’s e¤ort to separate (i.e. to signal his ability) is directed to writing program code to the OS
program. The utility of the programmer is assumed to depend on the wage
and the disutility of attaining the credential:
y
; UB = w y:
UG = w
2
In above G refers to ”good” type and B to ”bad” type, each attaining
credential y and earning the wage w. We extend the original signaling
analysis of Spence by focusing on the case where the activity of attaining the
programming credential y creates as a by-product an OS program that will
be freely available for consumers. Thus it will interact with the commercially
produced program in the consumer software market.

2.2

Software Market

In our analysis, the software company is a pro…t-maximising monopoly supplying the commercial program in the consumer market niche. The monop10

In reality such information is often posted on the open source projects’homepages in
the internet. See Linux -PAM (2003) and consult Hann et al (2002).
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olist employs a programmer with productivity , and creates the commercial
program in a project of size one. We assume that a program’s functionality
and thus quality in the eyes of the consumer is proportional to the amount
of code it contains. The amount of code the commercial program contains
and thus its quality11 is assumed to be equal to .
We de…ne that for a programming credential level of y, the programmer’s
e¤ort is manifested in jkjy lines of program code that consumers value. The
signalling activity, ie. the e¤ort to acquire a credential y; creates thus a
free open source (OS) program of quality jkjy in the consumer market. We
distinguish between three scenarios. We de…ne that for k = 0; the free
OS program is independent of the monopolist’s market, for k > 0; it is a
complement to the monopolist’s program, and for k < 0, the OS program is
an incomplete substitute to the monopolist’s commercial good.
At the outset we assume that there exist 4M consumers who di¤er in
their willingness to pay for the software, and where M is the measure of
market size. When only the commercial …rm’s software is available (k = 0),
consumers’ valuation of it is evenly distributed on the interval [0; ]. If
the signaling activity has resulted in a complement software to the …rm’s
commercial program (k > 0), consumers’valuation of it is increased and are
now on the interval [0; + ky] : Finally, if the signaling activity produces as
by-product a free substitute software ( k < 0), consumers valuations of the
commercial software are as before on the interval [0; ] and valuations of the
free software on [0; ky]. We assume throughout the analysis that the ratio
of valuations is equal for all consumers.12
In the case of independent signaling activity, the marginal consumer’s
11

Just as Fershtman and Gandal (2004), we measure the programmer’s contribution in
terms of lines of program code. Acknowledging the heterogeneity of the programming
languages, we refer to their …nding that a strong majority of OS projects are written in C
or C++ . Furthermore, such languages are used in a standardized fashion. This allows us
to project the contribution to functions of the program which in turn determine its value
to consumers.
12
The (consumer) market analysis draws on Kobolt (1995). Recently it has been elaborated and used to model interaction between commercial and free open source (OS) goods
in the software industry by Mustonen (2003, 2004).
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net valuation of the commercial …rm’s software is zero, Vm p = 0, where
Vm is the marginal consumer’s valuation of the …rm’s commercial software
and p refers to price. The distribution of willingness to pay of consumers
implies that the number of consumers that have a higher willingness to pay
p
Vm
than Vm is
4M . Maximization of pro…t function p
4M yields
the optimal price 2 and output 2M: If the signaling activity creates as a
by product the software that is a complement, the consumers’ valuations
are increased compared to the previous case. The number of consumers
Vm
4M .
with a willingness to pay higher than Vm is now equal to ( +ky)
+ky
+ky
Analoguously, the optimal price is 2 and output 2M:
The signaling activity may also create a substitute to the commercial
software i.e. k < 0. Now the software company has to take into account
the competing freely available OS software when pricing it’s own program.
The surplus of the marginal consumer between the commercial software
and the OS software has to be equal, Vm p = VOS 0; where VOS is the
m
= ky
marginal consumer’s valuation of the OS software. We know that VVOS
, and developing the marginal condition yields Vm = p +ky : As in the
case of independent signaling activity, the number of consumers with higher
willingness to pay for the …rm’s good is Vm 4M: Inserting the marginal
consumer’s valuation, pro…t maximization yields again the optimal price
+ky
and output 2M:
2
Thus we can cover all three cases by using the same revenue function,
and letting just k to vary
R = M ( + ky) ;
where M captures the ”market size e¤ect”, and where k may either
be positive, negative or zero. Note that though the revenue functions are
identical in the cases of complement and substitute OS programs, the market
outcomes are quite di¤erent. For a complement, the same consumers that
would have bought the commercial program anyway are willing to pay more
of that very program. In the case of substitutes some consumers buy the
commercial program, and the rest of the consumers acquire the competing
freely available OS program.
10
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Following the literature, we assume that the programmer has all the
bargaining power in the professional labor market, which implies that the
…rms will compete for the programmers, and end up with zero pro…ts
=R

w = M ( + ky)

w = 0:

Timing of the model is standard. At the outset nature assigns programmers’ productivities and the proportion of high and low productivity
programmers. Then a programmer may engage himself in obtaining a programming credential y, and thus simultaneusly creating a free OS program
that is either a complement or substitute to the commercially produced
one. A …rm hires a programmer with a programming credential equal to y
and pays out wage w: In the case of substitute programs, consumers buy the
commercial program or acquire the free good, and in the case of complementary programs, the consumers are willing to pay more for the commercial
program. At the end pro…ts are realized and wages are paid out.

3

The Analysis

In the professional labor market, strategies (yB ; yG ; w ) and a system of
beliefs
form the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). To build an equilibrium it is assumed that the attained programming credential is regarded
by commercial software companies as a credible signal of a programmer’s
innate ability. We assume that each programmer chooses the level of programming credential given the wage function w ( ; y) = M ( + ky). The
”bad” type thus faces a problem
yB 2 arg max[w (1; y)
y

y];

and the ”good” type
yG 2 arg max[w (2; y)
y

y
]:
2

The software company hires a programmer with a credential y at wage

11
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w ( ; y) =

(1 j y)M (1 + kyB ) + (1

(1 j y))M (2 + kyG )

(1)

with beliefs
that are consistent with equilibrium strategies yB ; yG : In
particular, if the optimal credential levels di¤er, yB 6= yG ; then if observed
y = yB ;
(1 j y) = 1 and if one observes y = yG ;
(1 j y) = 0: Of
course, in the case when the optimal credential levels coincide, yB = yG ;
then if observed credential y = yB = yG ;
(1 j y) = 1 q: Since the
predictive power of PBE is weak in a sense that it does not restrain the out
of equilibrium beliefs, in the rest of the paper we use the Cho-Kreps (1987)
intuitive criterion, and focus on the least cost separating (lcs) equilibrium.
Next, we analyze the optimal behavior of programmers and demonstrate
the implications of externalities. When individual programmers decide on
the level of credential they acquire in order to signal their skills, they do this
by anticipating the wage o¤er of the software company. Programmers thus
choose the optimal credential levels yG and yB by maximizing their utilities
UG and UB given the wage function (1)
The incentive compatibility constraints for ”bad” and ”good” programmers read as
M (1 + kyB )

yB

M (2 + kyG )

yG ;

(2)

yB
yG
M (1 + kyB )
:
(3)
2
2
In order to focus on the least cost separating equilibrium with standard
properties we constrain our analysis to cover the case when the magnitude
1
of externalities k 2 ( 1 < k
2M ]: That is, we consider the possibility of
a substitute OS program, and a not too strong complement OS program13 .
M (2 + kyG )

13

1
For the analysis of the equilibria for large positive externalities, k > 2M
, consult
Leppämäki and Mustonen (2004) where the authors show that the nature of least cost
separating equilibria may be quite di¤erent compared to the "normal" case analyzed in
the literature and here as well.

12
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We focus on the least cost separating equilibrium, yB 6= yG . Given the
software companies’s beliefs and wage function w , and since getting a
credential is costly, it is optimal for the "bad" programmer not to get one
yB = 0:
The "good" programmer chooses the lowest level of credential that allows
him to separate from the "bad" programmer. The level of credential the
"good" programmer will choose can be solved from the "bad" type’s binding
IC -constraint (2)
yG =

M
:
1 Mk

Consequently the wages are wB = M , wG = M 2 + k 1 MM k : In the
least cost separating equilibrium, the utilities of the programmers are
UB = M;
UG = 2M +

(2kM 1) M
:
2 (1 M k)

As we have now derived the least cost credential levels, we can state the
following result:
Proposition 1 The least-cost OS programming credential level that separates the "good" programmer from the "bad" programmer in the case of a
substitute (a complement) OS program is lower (higher) than in the case
when the OS program is independent, yGs < yGi < yGc :
Proof. It is enough to notice that in the case of substitutes (k < 0),
= 1 MM k is smaller than than yGi = M in the case of independent programs (k = 0), which in turn is smaller than yGc = 1 MM k in the case of
complements (k > 0):
When the OS programming to attain a credential creates a substitute
to the monopolist’s commercial program, the high productivity programmer su¤ers from this. The competition in the consumer market lowers the

yGs

13
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monopolist’s pro…ts and thus ultimately the wage the "good" programmer
receives once he is hired by the …rm. Thus the programmer optimally adjusts the credential level downwards. In the case of complementary goods
i.e. with positive market externalities the programmer internalizes the positive externality e¤ect via the increased wage bill, and thus optimally adjusts
the credential level upwards.
It is also useful to notice that the level of credential the "good" type has
to choose in order to signal credibly his type increases in the magnitude of
market externality, and this of course is also re‡ected in the utility as well.
In short, this simply means that given the choice over the type of an OS
project, the good "type" always prefers to go for OS projects that create
complements to commercial software. Interestingly this may not always be
the action preferred by the social planner. We come back to this point later
on in section 5. Finally it should not come as a surprise that if we assume
away market externalities i.e. set k = 0 and normalize market size e¤ect by
setting M = 1, the results we derive above coincide with those of Spence
(1973, 1974).

4

Screening with OS Programming

From previous section we have learned that in the PBE, commercial software
companies beliefs about the productivity of programmers are consistent, and
thus their behavior of hiring programmers with high programming credential
and paying them high wages is fully rational. In this section, we consider
the incentives of commercial software companies to support OS projects
…nancially.
In the following, we make a simplifying assumption that there exists
an outside employment option with wage wo , and this outside option is
accessible for both the low and high productivity programmers. To rule
out pooling equilibria, we want to examine now whether OS projects can
function as screening devices for commercial software companies. To do so
we assume that the level of outside wage is such that the software company
is unpro…table if it hires a programmer blindly. That is

14

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/4-29

R

wo = M (1 + q)

wo < 0:

Simply to exist in the …rst place, the software company has to screen programmers and then by hiring the high productivity programmer it makes
a positive market revenue. As before, since the programmer holds the bargaining power in the labor market, he receives all the revenue as wages. In
particular, we want to demonstrate that under these conditions it is in the
commercial software company’s interest to create and support open source
programming projects and use them as screening devices.
For simplicity, we assume that the support for open source projects is
materialized in the form of a lump-sum payment F . Then the pro…t of
the commercial software company reads as = M (2 + kyG ) F w = 0;
where yG is determined by the bad programmer’s incentive compatibility
constraint with respect to the outside wage w0 ;
M (2 + kyG )

F

yG

wo :

(4)

The least-cost separating level of programming credential is
2M wo F
(5)
1 Mk
From (5) we can see that the software company can provide …nancial
support for the OS project up to the di¤erence between the market revenue
from its program created by a good programmer and the outside wage,
F < 2M wo : Quite naturally the least cost separating credential is then
decreasing in F . We can summarize the discussion as follows:
yG =

Lemma 2 The commercial software companies do have incentives to support open source software projects in order to use them as screening devices
for their new labor force.
Perhaps one can even interpret this type of practices as outsourcing
of personnel management and recruiting activities. As such it is rather
clever managerial practice of motivating potential employees to signal their
capability without committing to hire anyone at that stage. It is useful to
15
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stress that in practise the support for OS projects may take various of forms
such as advice, sharing of information, providing technical support, and so
on. One should notice, that we are abstracting away from possible free-riding
problems among di¤erent software companies that might arise within such
an arrangement. Clearly, when two or more commercial software companies
are present and supporting the same OS project there is a possibility that the
competitor succeeds in hiring top programmers even though all companies
were supporting the OS project at the outset. However, this should not
change our reasoning qualitatively since it would only reduce the expected
pro…ts of software companies.

5

The Choice of An OS Project: Programmer’s
vs. Social Incentives

In section 3 we concluded that if the programmer can decide how to allocate
his attention in terms of attaining a credential it is clear that he will devote
attention towards the signaling activity that will produce as by-product
complementary software, since his utility in the least cost equilibrium is
@U
increasing in k; @kG > 0. In this section we derive conditions under which
this may be in con‡ict with the society’s interests.
In order to examine private and social incentives we need to …rst de…ne
the expression for the social welfare. The signaling activity as such is naturally costly for the programmer, but the resulting freely available software is
valued by consumers, and clearly this is valuable for the society as well. To
get a slightly more general view of the comparisons of private and social incentives we now characterize programmers with productivities G > B > 0
instead of 2 and 1: This is simply due to the fact that now the productivity
di¤erence does matter. When the software company employs the "good"
programmer, the social welfare, measured as the net of market surplus, wC
or wS 14 ; and the cost of signaling, in the case of a complement good, k > 0,
14

The market surplus in the case of a complement consists of the …rm’s revenue,
M ( G + kyG ), and the consumer surplus accruing to the buyers of the …rm’s program,
1
M ( G + kyG ). Thus wC = 32 M ( G + kyG ) : For a substitute, the surplus consists of
2
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is
yG

WC = wC

G

3
= M(
2

G

yG

+ kyG )

:

(6)

G

And in the case of a substitute, k < 0; the social welfare is equal to
WS = wS

3
= M
2

yG
G

G

yG

1
kyG
3

:

(7)

G

It’s useful to recall from earlier analysis that in the case of substitute
programs, pro…ts and thus wages are decreasing in k but the social welfare
as captured by (7) may increase in k: This is due to the fact that those
consumers that …nd the commercial program too expensive acquire instead
the freely available OS software.
As in previous section we assume that there exists an outside option
equal to wo , and set F = 0 in which case equation (4) yields
M(

G

+ kyG )

yG

wo ;

B

which implies that the least cost programming credential that the "good"
type chooses to separate is
(M G wo )
:
(8)
1 Mk B
The social welfare in the case of a complementary OS program is obtained
simply by inserting the expression (8) into (6):
B

yG =

3
WC = M
2

G

+k

B

(M G wo )
1 Mk B

(M G wo )
:
M k B)
G (1

B

When the free OS program is a substitute, the social welfare as expressed
in (7) yields after substitution
3
WS = M
2

G

1
k
3

B

(M G wo )
1 Mk B

(M G wo )
:
M k B)
G (1

B

the …rm’s revenue and the consumer surplus to the buyers of the …rm’s program, in total 32 M G , and the surplus to the users of the free substitute OS program, 12 M kyG .
Summed up, wS = 23 M G 31 kyG :
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Given these expressions, we …x the magnitude of the market externality
e¤ect equal to m in both cases. That is, k = m with a substitute and with
a complement, k = m: This is done simply to facilitate the comparison,
and we can thus examine under which conditions the society would prefer
a substitute OS project compared to a complementary OS project that we
know from above is always preferred by the individual programmer. That
is, we consider now the possibility that society as such is able to choose the
nature of an open source project. The straightforward comparison of above
expressions gives us the following result on the possible con‡ict of interest
between the private and social incentives over the choice of an OS project:
Proposition 3 When the size of the market (given the the magnitude of
G
programmers would prefer a
externality) is small i.e. when M < 22 GB B m
complement, but the society would go for a substitute, and (ii) when the
G
the private and social
size of the market is large i.e. when M > 22 GB B m
incentives coincide, and both would prefer the OS project that produces a
complementary software.
Proof. To develop the above result we simply need to derive the inequality WC (k = m) < WS (k = m) ; since we know from earlier that programmers always prefer complementary OS projects. Developing the above
inequality yields the following
3
M
2

G

3
M
2

+

G

3M m
2 (1 M m

+

B)

Mm
2 (1 + M m

B)

G (1

1
Mm

1
G (1 + M m

B)

<

B)

;

which simpli…es into
M<

2
2

B

G

G Bm

:

In short, the above proposition shows that the possibility of potential
con‡ict of interest over the choice of an OS project will depend most importantly on the size of the consumer market for software. The crucial point for
understanding this result is related to the di¤erent market outcomes under
18
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substitute and complementary programs. In particular, with a substitute
OS program some consumers will buy the commercial programs and the
rest will get the free OS software whereas with a complement only half of
the consumers use the commercial program and the complementing free OS
program. Since an individual programmer (and the commercial software
company) does not internalize the bene…cial e¤ects that are coming via the
consumer’s surplus it is clear that when the consumer market for software
are small there is a con‡ict of interest, and the society would prefer a substitute OS program to a complement. This con‡ict of interest, however,
vanishes when the size of the consumer market increases.
When interpreting the above proposition from other direction it is not
that easy to provide clear intuition for the result. However, we see that
when consumers’valuation for the commercial program is low, the welfare
associated with OS project resulting in a substitute program is higher. With
our speci…cations, larger welfare with a substitute OS program is possible
if the productivity di¤erence between the programmers is small; the "good"
programmer is less than twice as productive as the "bad" one.
Since we concluded that under some circumstances there is a potential
con‡ict between the private and social incentives over the choice of an OS
project, the natural follow-up question is whether the social optimum can
be achieved by some sort of public policy intervention. In this respect, the
answer that our analysis provides is rather straightforward, and points out
towards direct subsidies for the OS projects that will lead to substitute
programs when the consumer market for software is small.15

6

Conclusion

This paper introduced an idea of OS progamming as a signaling and screening device. In particular, we proposed a skill signaling model that extended
the celebrated Spence’s model in to the situation where the signaling activity itself may have externality e¤ects that are coming via the consumer
15

See Schmidt and Schnitzer (2003) who discuss extensively the role of public subsidies
for OS activities.
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market for software. The size and magnitude of externality e¤ect depends
on whether the free OS software is either a substitute or a complement to
the commercially produced one.
It was shown that "good" programmers have incentives to participate
in OS projects in order to signal their programming ability to commercial
software companies. Equally well, it was shown that it’s fully rational for the
software companies to interpret the high attained programming credential
in OS projects of being a credible signal of programmers’ innate ability
and thus pay them higher wages. In addition, we demonstrated that the
widely documented software companies’…nancial and other support for OS
projects can be understood from screening perspective. By supporting OS
projects the management of a software company is able to motivate potential
employees to demonstrate their programming capability without committing
to hire anyone at that stage.
Our focus on OSS is motivated by the ’virtuality’ of software and the
resulting possibly strong market responses to the availability of free OS
software. Of course, it is important to realize that our analysis is partial
in a sense that we focus on one market niche only. In reality, it may very
well be that even if the OS software is independent in this particular market
niche we examine, it may well have external e¤ects on some other market
niche. This is a natural question to be examined in future studies.
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